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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of organisational reliability is at 
the heart of the safety of at-risk systems. Many 
studies have been conducted in the nuclear 
industry; all emphasise the study of plants in 
normal, daily operation or during shutdowns. 
However, decommissioning, whether ongoing or 
planned, places a sharp focus on the question. This 
is because, on the one hand operating companies 
make significant changes to their organisation to 
meet the challenges and requirements of 
decommissioning, on the other they must 
subcontract a large number of tasks related to the 
decommissioning. The use of subcontractors is not 
new; in the nuclear industry it became widespread 
in the 1990s and now represents more than 80% of 
activity [1]. However, the specificities of 
decommissioning lead to a re-examination of the 
overall organisation and the conclusion that 
subcontractors are a key player in its success.  
The reliability of at-risk systems can be seen at 
play in collective action where the boundaries are 
drawn not only by the organisation itself, but also 
by the actors that compose it. Therefore an 
understanding of the overall logic of the 
organisation and its impact on safety issues 
requires subcontractors to be considered as full 
members of a modern organisation. 
In this article, we first present the theoretical 
concepts of organisational reliability. Secondly, we 
describe the limitations of current models in 
relation to the specific role of subcontractors in the 
organisation. Finally, the third part looks at the 
measures necessary to integrate subcontractors 
into the organisation of decommissioning 
operations. 
ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY AND THE NUCLEAR 
INDUSTRY 
In 2004, Bourrier noted that it had become 
trivial to claim that the reliability and failure of 
systems are produced by the organisation [2]. 
However, she also highlighted that the definition of 
the organisation differs according to the discipline – 
it does not have the same meaning for ergonomists, 
psychologists or sociologists. 
The aim of this section is first to revisit what is 
meant by the organisation as understood by 
organisational sociologists. We then briefly review 
some seminal studies on organisational reliability in 
the nuclear industry. 
A sociological definition of the organisation 
James Reason’s appeal to organisational 
sociologists to better understand the organisational 
dimension of system safety [3] has been understood 
in different ways depending on the academic 
background of the researcher. The object in 
question is a composite and should be seen as at 
the intersection of several research issues. If we 
define organisational reliability as, “the study of 
organisational conditions that enables a complex 
organised system to maintain reliability levels 
consistent with both safety and economic 
requirements” (Bourrier, p.12) [2], then it is clear 
that the main purpose is as much to investigate 
errors caused by operators as to look for latent 
errors in systems that are the product of decisions 
taken at various levels of the organisation. Reason 
reminds us that while the active errors made by 
operators are known and well-documented, the 
same is not true of latent errors and in fact the 
situation is far from what is required [3]. Latent 
errors are hidden at various levels of the system 
and their unexpected succession can lead to 
catastrophes in industrial systems that were 
thought to be protected. The identification of 
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latent errors therefore requires immersion in the 
organisation in order to understand their hidden 
logic; something that cannot be seen from a direct 
reading of the official organogram. 
The organisation is often defined as an 
architecture, which, with the help of a system of 
rules, constrains human behaviour in order to 
achieve the desired goal. However, this approach 
appears reductive to organisational sociologists. 
Although the sociology of organisations is a 
grouping of disparate organisational theories [4], 
they all seem to place the emphasis on interactions 
between actors that cannot be accounted for by 
managerial rationality. 
Traditionally, for organisational sociologists 
(particularly strategic analysts) the “one best way” 
of Taylor [5] seen in the guise of Scientific 
Management does not represent the real 
relationships in the organisation. Strategic analysis 
sees the organisation as a construct that exists to 
bring people together in a cooperative relationship 
despite differences of interest. The aim of 
organisational research is therefore to try to better 
understand the mechanisms that enable individuals 
to cooperate in collective action. Two key books, 
“the actor and the system” from Crozier [6] and 
the “power and the rules” of Friedberg [7] provide 
the intellectual foundations for strategic analysis 
that is based on a triptych of power, games and 
strategy. According to strategic analysis, although 
the individuals in an organisation must take the 
rules into account, their choices are not necessarily 
prescribed by the rules. Rather, they are the result 
of strategies that individuals pursue to make best 
use of the resources and constraints of the 
situation they find themselves in. Moreover, the 
need for individuals to resolve shared problems is 
the origin of a set of power relations that structure 
relationships in the organisation. These 
relationships that can be seen on a sociogram1 form 
the basis of the informal organisation, also called 
the real organisation. According to strategic 
analysis, only this auxiliary organisation merits 
research. 
Organisational sociologists, notably Crozier and 
Friedberg [6, 7] encourage the investigation and 
1 The sociogram is a schematic representation 
of the relations between actors that shows the 
alliances, conflicts, dependencies, etc. between 
them.  
bringing to light of the real organisation on the 
basis of strategies pursued by its actors. While the 
rationality of decisions is very often measured in 
terms of the homo economicus, organisational 
sociologists prefer to think in terms of bounded 
rationality [8]. This approach, which has the effect 
of de-emphasising individual decision-making in 
favour of the organisational context in which 
decisions are made, significantly changes the 
knowledge that it is possible to have of 
organisations and makes it possible to anticipate 
the potential impact of interactions between actors 
on system safety. 
This perspective helps us to understand how, 
independent of the context provided by the formal 
organisation the rationale of the auxiliary 
organisation as a whole can bring with it its own 
fragiliites that weaken the defences of the system 
to the point where an accident occurs. Bourrier [9] 
goes further in the analysis, highlighting the 
relation between organisational conditions and the 
so-called informal organisation that is the fruit of 
deals done between actors. 
The organisation and systems’ reliability: the 
nuclear sector 
Approaches to organisational reliability have 
sometimes, for the most notorious incidents, led to 
post-accident studies. Among the seminal works, 
studies of systemic accidents such as the 
Challenger shuttle accident by sociologist Diane 
Vaughan [10], and the nuclear accident at Three 
Mile Island described by Charles Perrow [11] are 
pioneers. 
However, to understand and bring to light 
latent errors that are found at various levels of the 
organisation, distant from operators who are in 
direct contact with the system, requires the 
observation of the organisation’s daily routine. This 
proposal was made by the Berkeley High Reliability 
Organization (HRO) group [12]. In contrast to the 
theory of the normal accident described by Perrow 
[11], which considers that every complex 
sociotechnical system is doomed to experience an 
accident, the HRO group put forward the 
hypothesis that some so-called high-risk 
organisations have established an organisational 
design and characteristics that enable them to 
maintain, despite extreme constraints, very high 
levels of human performance. 
This desire to understand organisations that are 
subject to powerful political, technical and societal 
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constraints made it possible to bring to light 
organisational characteristics that explain their 
high level of performance, without necessarily 
leading to the definition of a universal and 
transferrable model of reliability. Using a research 
methodology that is similar to that found in 
ethnography, this research also showed that to 
know the organisation, it is necessary to maintain a 
close relationship with its culture and mode of 
operation, classical analysis grids are not 
universally applicable to all organisations studied. 
This auxiliary nature of the organisation that is also 
characteristic of French-style organisational 
sociology [6, 7] has inspired a number of research 
papers in the field.  
Among the most notable work is that of 
Bourrier [2, 9], who demonstrated a very clear link 
between the organisation and the reliability of 
nuclear power plants. In a comparison of American 
and French nuclear power stations during a 
shutdown, Bourrier made clear the relationships 
and the thought processes of actors while working 
on the system. A perfect example of a critical 
phase, the shutdown has stimulated the interest of 
researchers [13] in that the normal organisation of 
the plant is replaced by a temporary organisation. 
In this short timeframe, successive maintenance 
operations must be carried out by actors working 
under the pressure of strong economic constraints. 
In her analysis of nuclear power plants from the 
point of view of both deals done and organisational 
design, Bourrier argues that these various levels of 
analysis must be taken into account in planning 
system safety. 
All these studies aspire to enrich theories of 
organisational reliability. They respond to the need 
to have a better understanding of “organisational 
ecosystems” [2] in order to design research 
methods that can account for the latent errors that 
lurk in systems. 
However, all of the studies carried out in the 
nuclear sector have tended to focus on operational 
systems [14]. The next section therefore focuses on 
the organisational dimension of plant reliability 
during the decommissioning phase, paying 
particular attention to the role of the 
subcontractor. 
ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY AND 
SUBCONTRACTING: DECOMMISSIONING 
The expansion of subcontracting in the nuclear 
sector has been extensively studied both during 
normal operations and particularly during 
maintenance operations. The situation is often 
described in the scientific literature as an 
oppressor-oppressed relationship in which the 
subcontractor is both the victim of risk outsourcing 
by the client and the primary source of failure [1, 
15, 16].  
Several French studies have made clear this 
level of dependence and stressed its negative 
impacts on occupational health and safety 
(Thébaut-Mony) [1].  The aim of this section on 
subcontracting is to first present the various forms 
of subcontracting found in the nuclear industry. 
Secondly, it highlights how subcontractors interact 
with the client’s maintenance teams during 
scheduled shutdown operations. Finally, it shows 
that these relationships take a new turn in a 
decommissioning phase that takes place over a 
vastly longer timescale (up to several decades). 
The various forms of subcontracting 
It is customary to confine subcontracting to its 
legal definition, “subcontracting is the operation by 
which a business through a subcontract, and 
coming under its responsibility, gives to another 
person called a subcontractor the execution, in 
whole or in part of the contracted business or part 
of a public contract concluded with the client” 
(unofficial translation of French Loi de 1975, 
article 1) [17]. 
The subcontractor, by extension, is often 
considered to be placed in an insecure position by a 
contract that gives supremacy to the client. 
However, there is not one monolithic form of 
subcontracting. It can be looked at under a classic 
typology that takes into account different forms 
that are based on business needs (specialty and 
cascade subcontracting for example). It can also be 
examined using a “spatial” approach that 
distinguishes between in situ sub-contractors (who 
carry out work on the client’s premises) and those 
who operate on their own premises. In the case of 
the nuclear industry, it is the former that interests 
us if we want to understand their relationship with 
the client organisation’s various services. Rather 
than their legal status, it is the nature of the 
relationship that the subcontractor has with the 
client that is relevant [18]. The next section 
outlines the role played by subcontractors during 
shutdowns. 
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Subcontracting and shutdowns 
Subcontracting in the nuclear sector has raised 
many questions concerning the motivation of the 
client to outsource risk. It has often been analysed 
as a desire to resort to an insecure workforce in 
order to respond to competitition in the sector. 
Shutdowns symbolise this sense of domination. In a 
timeframe that gets shorter and shorter the 
nomadic workforce is obliged to work to a very 
tight shutdown schedule. The urgency of the 
shutdown and the fact that it has a management 
mode that is different to normal plant operations 
reinforces this sense of domination. The 
particularities of the sector, where time spent on a 
task is directly related to adverse effects on 
occupational health and safety has also had the 
effect of creating doubt about whether the real 
intention of the operator might be to avoid 
exposing its own employees and instead outsource 
tasks considered dangerous for workers. 
More generally, outsourcing may have a 
potentially negative impact on plant safety. A 
French parliamentary report [19] underlined the 
potential risks to system reliability of using 
subcontractors. According to the report, in 
resorting to the wholesale use of subcontractors, 
operators both water down their responsibilities 
and run the risk of not fully understanding the true 
skill-level of the actors who carry out 
interventions. In some cases, it is possible to find a 
cascade of subcontractors, which makes it 
impossible to be certain that the entire chain 
consists of workers who are actually trained to 
carry out the required tasks. 
This opaque relationship between client and 
subcontractor together with the particularities of 
the sector therefore has a certain bearing on the 
judgements that come into play during operations. 
Both the employees of the subcontractor and those 
of the operator should have an opinion of each 
other that reflects their professional identity and 
hierarchical position. However, in the nuclear 
industry, subcontractors cannot be reduced to the 
stereotypical image of the nomad worker that is 
often associated with them [13]. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the systematic use of 
subcontractors has changed the role and mission of 
the operator’s employees, who no longer do work 
themselves but instead arrange to have it done. 
The growth in subcontracting has led to changes in 
how shutdowns are organised. Currently, a 
temporary management unit dedicated to the 
shutdown has to be created and preparations have 
to be made well in advance in order to be able to 
hand over control to subcontractors. 
This control, which must take into account both 
the budget for the shutdown and task planning, 
determines the organisation of the plant during the 
shutdown. To achieve the shutdown objectives, an 
interface must be created between the plant’s 
employees and those of the subcontractor that is 
mediated by the project and works manager. 
Project managers are responsible for organising 
the work of subcontractors, while works managers 
must check that the planned work has actually 
been carried out on the ground. The organisation of 
work according to what is written down still leaves 
room for local deals that diverge from what has 
been prescribed. As Bourrier wrote, “Despite the 
necessary preparation of schedules, until work 
begins the hourly timetable of those responsible for 
carrying it out is not known. However, service 
providers have an absolute need to know exactly 
when they should arrive, and especially how many 
free weekends they can expect, so that they can 
return to their families” (Bourrier, p.163) [9]. This 
need to organise themselves therefore leads 
subcontractors to make tacit deals with the project 
and works managers. It is very likely that these 
deals can be found at other levels in the 
subcontracting chain and also that they do not 
come to the attention of planners or the shutdown 
manager. These grey areas then form the basis of 
the informal organisation described by a strategic 
analysis, which it is necessary to be familiar with 
and analyse in order to truly know the real 
organisation. 
The informal organisation therefore constitutes 
the field of investigation. The everyday realities of 
the shutdown are not reflected in its official 
version. Oppressed workers may not be those who 
they first seemed. The operator’s employees are 
under pressure during the shutdown and service 
providers are necessary to meet the demands of 
the market and fulfil orders. Subcontractors are 
used to working on different systems; therefore 
they have both technical expertise and are 
accustomed to working with clients. Moreover, they 
have a good understanding the technical and 
organisational constraints of the operator and can 
pursue strategies that preserve their 
independence. This power that they have over the 
organisation gives them a certain degree of 
autonomy that can have a bearing on the reliability 
of the system as defined by procedures. 
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A short-term shutdown does not necessarily 
challenge collective action that, as the various 
stoppages progress is focussed on two outcomes: 
for the subcontractor, carring out the required 
work and for the operator, ensuring the resumption 
of operations as quickly as possible. Joint shutdown 
preparations, drawn up well in advance allow 
service providers and clients to plan the tasks to be 
carried out in detail, taking into account the 
requirements of both parties [20]. 
The following section shows that 
decommissioning, throughout its duration, does not 
follow the same pattern as the shutdown. Although 
the parties involved in decommissioning may look 
like the two types of organisation, the timeframe is 
much longer, which changes the relationship 
between the actors. 
Subcontracting and decommissioning 
When a plant is to be decommissioned, there 
are constant references to the shutdown. This 
reference is directly linked to the hiring of large 
numbers of service providers. However, the 
relationship to time changes as decommissioning 
takes place over a period that makes it is difficult 
to foresee all the operations to be carried out. This 
opaqueness in planning and the need to improvise 
that are inherent in this new phase of the plant’s 
life reinforce differences in the information 
available to stakeholders 
It is also necessary to note that 
decommissioning is traumatic for longstanding 
actors at the plant, who see in it the “death of the 
system” and the deconstruction of their working 
tool. Decommissioning that follows a period of 
intense activity turns the existing organisation 
upside down. The organisation, which had 
previously dedicated itself to operations, must now 
re-orient itself to decommissioning with all the 
symbolism that that entails. 
The case of the decommissioning of the 
Superphénix plant in France is symptomatic of this 
situation. Research carried out from an 
anthropological perspective highlighted the 
symbolic death of the plant and its impact on 
employees, “Those who worked at Creys-Malville 
had to mourn the loss of their magnificent tool. To 
soothe their psychological wounds, they created an 
amazing memorial for Superphénix, we carried out 
a symbolic burial with a real headstone, one of 
them says. The stone is still there, stuck in the 
ground near one of the entry gates” [21]. It is 
essential to understand this aspect of 
decommissioning to appreciate the state of mind of 
the operator’s employees when work is carried out. 
Although the situation is very different depending 
on whether the decommissioning is the result of a 
sudden political decision (such as the one that led 
to the shutdown of Superphénix) or whether it is 
the result of a programmed decision (as was the 
case at the Phénix plant, also in France) the 
decision has serious implications for all workers. It 
has two main consequences. The first is the 
challenge to the formal organisation and the 
implicit hierarchy that exists between operations 
and maintenance services. The second is the 
challenge to the informal organisation that is based 
on the deals made between actors who were trying 
to keep the plant working. 
The effect of a modification to the formal 
organisation is to give preeminence to maintenance 
services. Supervision remains the guarantor of 
system safety, but the final objective is very much 
decommissioning. This modification of the formal 
organisation that is accompanied by a reduction in 
the number of staff at the plant and widespread 
subcontracting therefore leads actors and services 
to acknowledge a change in professional identity 
and to shift into a known operating phase, i.e. the 
shutdown. Repeated references to the shutdown 
then become synonymous with the relationship that 
links the plant’s employees with service providers.  
The second modification relates to the informal 
organisation. This plays a role in the loss of 
information and in the day-to-day deals that enable 
the plant to operate, independently of formal 
operating procedures and contractual relationships 
that link it with service providers. 
Moreover, these changes must coexist in a 
relation to time that is very different to that of 
normal operations. In the day-to-day functioning of 
the plant, time compresses under production 
constraints. A symptom of these economic 
constraints is that shutdown periods have become 
shorter and shorter over the past 20 years. As the 
previous section noted, the shutdown order 
requires the actual shutdown to be planned well in 
advance. A successful shutdown must be planned 
and prepared up to six months before it actually 
happens. The manager who coordinates the 
shutdown can be compared to the conductor of an 
orchestra; a role that enables them to mobilise all 
participants. Deals may be made, but they are 
often known by everyone concerned. 
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In the decommissioning phase, time slows 
down. In the context of the Superphénix 
decommissioning, Berger [21] noted that the sense 
of time changed, “Bring back our silent clocks that 
show suspended time, decommissioning time, like 
the half-life of radioactive materials that are 
stored while waiting for the radioactivity to 
naturally decay. Talking about the decommissioning 
in terms of half-life is a good description of the 
programmed death of the site.” 
Decommissioning constitutes a new and 
unknown phase for plant actors and is therefore the 
origin of a new type of risk linked to human and 
organisational factors. This aspect, examined in 
detail in an Institut de Radioprotection et de 
Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) report [22] emphasises the 
need to take specific account of subcontractor 
activities during the decommissioning operation. 
The IRSN report focuses on risks related to 
radioprotection that have an impact on workers. It 
also examines concurrent activities, which can 
have a significant impact on both the safety of 
employees and the plant. The IRSN report argues 
that risks associated with human and organisational 
factors must be treated with the same rigor during 
decommissioning, as during the operational phase. 
Decommissioning creates a new reality for the 
actors at the plant that translates into significant 
adjustments at all levels of the organisation. The 
reorganisation of services implies that all actors 
must take ownership of the challenges of 
decommissioning and develop a perspective of time 
that is not that of the shutdown and no longer that 
of production but is that of decommissioning. 
The nature of the relationship between the 
operator’s employees and subcontractors also 
changes. Although the supervisory services of the 
operator remain the guarantor of the safety of the 
installation and therefore the issue of intervention 
orders, it is clear that maintenance services take 
precedence over other services. This change in the 
power structure at the plant means that 
maintenance services who manage contracts with 
subcontractors find themselves face-to-face with 
external companies. The pressures of economic 
constraints weigh heavily on decommissioning and 
action is guided by their economic and technical 
objectives. 
The project manager is reminded on a daily 
basis of the economic pressures that dominate the 
phases of the final shutdown and actual 
decommissioning. Although plant safety is 
paramount during the decommissioning, the use of 
specialised decommissioning companies can lead to 
a feeling of loss of control over what is happening 
on the ground. Unlike the shutdown, which is 
planned well in advance and where the modes of 
adjustment are well-known, decommissioning 
requires adjustments over a longer period and 
dealing with an operational context that is 
constantly changing. 
The interface between employees of the 
operator (who suffer the effects of the 
reorganisation following the shutdown) and 
employees of subcontractors (who take control of 
the plant to carry out the major phases of the 
decommissioning) can therefore create a sense of 
loss of control for the operator’s employees and a 
large grey area for subcontractor’s employees. 
Differences in what information is available then 
acts in the favour of sub-contractors who can 
impose their own planning constraints independent 
of the operator’s planning for the project [23]. 
The principal risk in this context is that the 
planning unit set up by the operator is not able to 
understand the reality on the ground and the 
operator senses a loss of control. This is 
characterised by slippage in the schedule for 
reasons that are not obvious to the operator. In this 
situation, it is necessary to look again at the 
relationship between the client and subcontractors 
in order that the organisational dimension of the 
project does not interfere with its coherence 
execution. 
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR 
Subcontracting in the nuclear sector, as in 
other industrial sectors leads to a very direct re-
examination of the question of the definition of the 
organisation. Should the relationship with 
subcontractors be analysed from an inter-
organisational perspective or should the 
subcontractor be considered as one of the 
organisation’s own actors? This section presents 
two possible responses to this question and looks at 
their effects on system safety. 
First, the relationship between client and 
subcontractor is considered in terms of a strictly 
contractual relationship. Secondly, the 
subcontractor is considered to be an actor in an 
extended organisation. 
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The client/subcontractor relationship: The risks 
of a strictly contractual relationship 
Although this article discusses subcontracting in 
the nuclear industry and specifically, during 
decommissioning, it seems useful to make an 
anthropological detour via the aerospace sector 
and a well-known accident in order to gain an 
insight into the dynamics of the 
client/subcontractor relationship and their 
consequences for decision-making. 
Diane Vaughan in her book on the Challenger 
shuttle accident [10] pointed out that during the 
programme NASA had favoured a bureaucratic 
culture, to the detriment of the technical culture 
of NASA engineers. Although the technical culture 
still existed, engineers were forced to make 
compromises in order to follow the rules as they 
were so busy with their administrative tasks. 
“Production constraints censored intuition and the 
subjective concerns of individuals that were so 
important in the organisation of research and 
development during the Apollo period. Finally, the 
bureaucratic reporting procedures unexpectedly 
contributed to the normalisation of deviance. (...) 
They believed that by respecting all these rules and 
procedures they were doing everything in their 
power to ensure the safety of the shuttle”. 
(Vaughan in Bourrier, p. 215) [2]. 
Subcontracting was a feature of the Challenger 
program, as was respect for very complex rules 
intended to ensure the reliability of the shuttle. 
History has shown however, that the trade-off 
between contract management and strictly 
technical decisions acted against the reliability of 
the shuttle. 
In the context of organisational changes due to 
decommissioning, the shift from doing things 
yourself, to arranging for things to be done requires 
the management of contracts and in some cases, 
relegating technical issues to the background. The 
need to deal with administration at the expense of 
skills and technical discussions about the operations 
to be performed distances the subcontractor and 
confines them to the role of interlocutor in a 
contractual relationship. However, subcontractors 
working on decommissioning activities operate in a 
very grey area that is on the one hand the 
consequence of their own competence that has 
been acquired on different sites and on the other, 
their deep understanding of the domain. Seen from 
this perspective, maintaining a solely contractual 
relationship leads to the marginalisation of a key 
actor in the organisation. 
The client/subcontractor relationship: Rethinking 
the boundaries of the organisation 
The question that then arises is how to redefine 
the boundaries of the organisation so that the 
interactions between service providers and 
operators can be understood in terms of a strategic 
analysis. These interactions and the underlying 
challenges effectively determine the real 
organisation. 
When analysing the relationship between 
clients and subcontractors, it seems appropriate to 
focus on communication between the actors. The 
strategies and communication methods used by the 
subcontractor in the context of its contractual 
relationship provide a better understanding of the 
modalities of cooperation and joint regulation [24] 
in the decommissioning organisation. The literature 
clearly describes the strategies of corporate 
networks who try to control their subcontractors 
[25]. However, these studies emphasise the 
relational investments between the two companies 
that must cooperate. Subcontractors are 
encouraged to strengthen their partnership with 
their clients by market pressure and competition. 
In the context of decommissioning there is 
sometimes a genuine partnership between 
companies and project managers. However, 
regulations governing the relationships between 
corporate clients and service providers limit the 
extent of the partnership and lead actors to find 
opportunities for dialogue and discussion that go 
beyond traditional organisational boundaries. 
There is a need to find common ground that 
goes beyond the informal competition/cooperation 
relationships that develop between subcontractors 
and between subcontractors and project managers. 
A French law, passed in 1990 [26] significantly 
altered the relationship between the employees of 
the client company and the employees of the 
subcontractor. The need to respect the autonomy 
of the subcontractor gave rise to an obligation of 
non-interference that applies to the client 
company. The effect was to improve the interface 
between teams working on the same site. In these 
conditions, opportunities to discuss the actual work 
being carried out remain rare. The difficulty of 
updating management tools for consignments and 
the issue of intervention orders is a symptom of 
this state of affairs. Tensions generated by a lack 
Page 8 
of information can lead to decisions being taken 
that may have consequences for system safety. 
Unwanted concurrent activity is a typical example 
of this. 
Rethinking the role of the subcontractor 
therefore aims to both make them a partner while 
at the same time remaining aware of the contract 
that governs the relationship. The subcontractor is 
in a position that obliges them to meet the 
requirements of the contract they signed with the 
operator; however they should not be seen as the 
victim of an oppressor. Their decommissioning 
expertise means that they are equipped to respond 
to the objectives of the operator. It is up to the 
operator to put in place measures that support the 
expression of this partnership. 
So far, this seems to be the only way to foster 
interactions that can create shared meaning in 
order to successfully carry out a complex operation 
whose timeframe may seem very distant to 
stakeholders. 
CONCLUSION 
Subcontracting in the nuclear industry has 
provided material for a great deal of research both 
during normal operations and in the 
decommissioning phase. However it requires special 
attention in the decommissioning phase. Although 
it is analogous to a shutdown, decommissioning is 
very different. On the one hand, it leads to a 
reorganisation of the operator, which has 
consequences that are likely to affect the initial 
level of reliability of the organisation. On the other 
hand, it takes place over a very long period of time 
and requires unfamiliar techniques. Prior planning 
for the shutdown immediately runs into the 
problem of a moving time horizon that makes it 
very difficult to anticipate when external 
companies will be required to intervene. The 
second difficulty relates to the sense of loss of 
competence and knowledge of the field. An 
evaluation of organisational reliability must take 
into account the distance between between the 
organisations’s various actors and consider the 
subcontractor to be a full member of the 
organisation in the sense of a strategic analysis. 
From this perspective, relationships between the 
client and the subcontractor are no longer 
dependent but are based on strategies that 
necessarily lead to alliances and partnerships. An 
understanding of the organisational challenges that 
are specific to each system involved in 
decommissioning makes it possible to limit 
uncertainties that influence system safety. 
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